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Perspective of Developing Countries 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The vast majority of development economists argues that there is a clear case for 
free trade. As one survey of empirical studies notes, “openness to trade has 
unambiguously helped the representative Third World economy” (Lindert and 
Williamson as quoted in World Bank 2002: 5). By contrast, recent studies reveal 
ambiguous effects of capital flows to developing countries (DCs).1 This 
indicates that the case for free capital flows is considerably weaker than the case 
for free trade. 
Nevertheless, major industrialized countries (ICs) and international financial 
institutions, notably the IMF, urged DCs to remove capital-account restrictions 
until recently. After serious financial crises in Asia and Latin America, however, 
previous supporters of unrestricted capital mobility, including the IMF, took  a 
                                           
1  For instance, Rodrik (1998: 61) found “no evidence that countries without capital controls have 
grown faster”.     2
more differentiated position. According to the newly emerging consensus, debt-
related capital flows, especially if they are short-term, are too risky for DCs to 
rely upon (The Economist 2003). At the same time, DCs are strongly advised to 
open up to inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI). This type of inflow is 
considered superior to foreign debt for several reasons, including being less 
volatile and carrying additional benefits such as technology transfers. 
Policymakers in most DCs seem to agree. Almost all DCs are now eager to take 
part in the worldwide competition for FDI. FDI regulations and restrictions have 
been relaxed substantially since the early 1990s. In 1991-2001, about 95 percent 
of all changes in national FDI regimes, reported by UNCTAD (2002: 7), were 
meant to treat FDI more favorably. Apart from unilateral liberalization 
measures, DCs have entered into numerous bilateral and plurilateral investment 
treaties that offer protection to foreign direct investors. Against this backdrop, it 
may come as a surprise that various DCs are strictly opposed to multilateral 
negotiations on investment in the so-called Doha Development Round of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). 
As argued in the following, the opponents to a multilateral investment 
agreement have a point. In strictly economic terms, the case for such an 
agreement is considerably weaker than its proponents are claiming. For 
political-economy reasons, however, it does not appear promising if DCs 
attempted to block WTO negotiations on investment. Rather, they should     3
consider the option to offer investment-related concessions of the sort ICs are 
asking for. By doing so, DCs would improve their chances to get quid pro quo-
concessions from ICs in areas of vital interest to DCs. 
This article proceeds in several steps, in order to substantiate this proposition: 
¾  The first question is why the standard arguments advanced by the 
proponents of a multilateral framework for investment (MFI) are not 
compelling. 
¾  Second, the requests of some DCs for what they consider to be a 
“balanced” or “development friendly” MFI, including, e.g., binding 
corporate obligations, are shown to be equally uncompelling. 
¾  Third, the strategic options are discussed which DCs have when ICs insist 
on WTO negotiations on investment. 
II.  HOW STRONG IS THE CASE FOR A MFI? 
According to the Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration, the purpose of a new 
framework on investment is “to secure transparent, stable, and predictable 
conditions for long-term cross-border investment” (WTO 2001: Paragraph 20). 
In other words, a MFI is primarily perceived to reduce so-called transaction 
costs and, thereby, to stimulate higher FDI flows. Transaction costs that may 
hinder FDI flows to DCs include: entry restrictions such as approval procedures     4
and limited access to specific industries; post-entry restrictions, notably 
performance requirements, related to local content, exports etc., that are imposed 
on foreign investors; and risk factors embedded in the legal and regulatory 
systems of host countries. 
Particularly the business community in ICs claims that binding multilateral rules 
and disciplines on FDI would be in the interest of WTO members at all levels of 
economic development. A MFI could indeed be in the mutual interest of home 
and host countries of FDI if transaction costs were lowered significantly in this 
way, and if DCs could derive more benefits from additional FDI. It is open to 
question, however, whether these conditions are met. First of all, there appears 
to be less potential for transaction-cost reductions to be realized multilaterally 
than the proponents of a MFI assume. According to survey results presented by 
the European Round Table of Industrialists (2000), transaction costs of the sort 
just mentioned are no longer perceived to be a major bottleneck to FDI. The 
average score of the 28 DCs included in the survey declined to about half the 
score in 1992 for each of the five indicators of transaction costs listed in Figure 
1. Given the range of survey results from 0 to 6, with lower values indicating a 
more liberal treatment of FDI, the evidence points to substantial unilateral 
liberalizations of FDI regulations in the past. 
Furthermore, multilateral negotiations would have little effect on transaction 
costs unless the intransparency resulting from overlapping legal instruments and     5
the intricate net of bilateral and plurilateral investment treaties were to be 
overcome by a MFI. This is highly unlikely. What can reasonably be expected 
from the Doha Round is a kind of “WTO plus” investment framework. This 
means that a MFI would define the smallest common denominator of all WTO 
members, while more substantive agreements with limited membership would 
remain in place. It is difficult to imagine substantially reduced transaction costs 
in such a setting. 
Figure 1 — Transaction – Cost – Related Impediments to FDI in 28 Developing 
Countries
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aSurvey results range from 0 (most liberal) to 6 (most restrictive). 
Source: European Round Table of Industrialists (2000). 
It is also open to question whether FDI flows would actually increase, as argued 
by many proponents of a MFI, simply because transaction costs were reduced.     6
Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2002) performed various empirical estimates on the 
determinants of FDI in DCs. It turned out that transaction cost-related variables 
play at best a marginal role as drivers of FDI, notably compared to market-
related determinants (market size, per capita income). It fits into this picture that 
the absence of multilaterally binding FDI rules has not prevented the 
tremendous boom of FDI in DCs in the 1990s. Moreover, other empirical studies 
revealed that bilateral investment treaties (BITs) did not exert a significant 
impact on FDI flows to signatory countries, even though various BITs offer 
investors a degree of protection that goes far beyond what can reasonably be 
achieved in the Doha Round (UNCTAD 1998; World Bank 2003). 
Finally, even if FDI flows were stimulated by a MFI, it is anything but 
guaranteed that all DCs could derive economic benefits from FDI. To the extent 
that such benefits are reflected in higher economic growth of developing host 
countries, the available empirical evidence is at odds with the euphoria about 
FDI prevailing among policymakers.2 As it seems, DCs must have reached a 
minimum level of economic development before they can capture growth-
enhancing effects of FDI. Weak markets and institutions typically prevailing in 
poor DCs tend to seriously constrain the growth effects of FDI. Consequently, 
the international community is focusing on the wrong question when, e.g., the 
                                           
2   For a detailed discussion, see Nunnenkamp (2002).     7
UN (2002: 5) argues that the central challenge is to attract FDI to a larger 
number of DCs. Succeeding in this respect would solve only the minor part of 
the problem. The crux is that a low level of development tends to constrain the 
role FDI can play in promoting economic growth in DCs. 
In summary, there are various reasons why the effects of a MFI on FDI in DCs 
are likely to fall short of high expectations, at least as long as the focus of a MFI 
is on transaction-cost reductions as suggested by its proponents in ICs. This 
invites the next question, namely whether DCs would fare better if they 
succeeded in reaching a “balanced” and “development friendly” agreement. 
III. HOW SENSIBLE ARE THE DEMANDS OF DCs? 
DCs have two major requests which they consider essential for improving the 
development impact, i.e., the “quality” of FDI. As concerns their own FDI 
policies, DCs insist on flexibility which would allow them to pursue selective 
and targeted FDI policies. At the same time, DCs argue that a balanced MFI 
must include binding corporate obligations, ranging from precautions against 
unfair business practices to obligatory technology transfers. Both requests are 
meant to foster the development friendliness of FDI. The subsequent paragraphs 
rather suggest that this amounts to wishful thinking. 
DCs do have a point when they regard existing bilateral and plurilateral 
investment agreements as biased in favor of business interests. According to the     8
World Bank (2003: 127), “the negotiating asymmetries that are common to 
bilateral agreements have led to treaties in which developing countries have 
taken on substantive obligations without any reciprocity other than the promise 
of increases in future private investment.” Yet, it is questionable whether 
development objectives would be easier to achieve, and higher quality FDI be 
attracted, if a MFI contained binding corporate obligations. If corporate 
obligations really bite, e.g., by rendering technology transfers mandatory, 
foreign investors always have the option not at all to invest, especially where 
they consider the protection of intellectual property rights to be deficient. Hence, 
DCs should be aware that they face a trade-off: the more binding corporate 
obligations become, the less FDI they may get. 
A similar trade-off exists when DCs insist on flexible and selective FDI policies. 
It comes at the cost of transparency and predictability if DCs are not prepared to 
tie their own hands. In other words, the transaction-cost argument, discussed in 
the previous section, might become irrelevant altogether if FDI rules were to 
become rather flexible. More importantly, the argument for flexibility and 
selectivity rests on a dubious assumption, namely that “development clauses”, 
performance requirements and the like are effective in promoting economic 
development. Previous experience with performance requirements such as local-
content rules, technology-sharing obligations and local equity participation in 
the form of joint ventures suggests otherwise. A detailed account of performance 
requirements found FDI to be harmful to the growth and welfare of developing     9
host countries when foreign investors were burdened with high local content, 
mandatory joint ventures and technology-sharing requirements (Moran 1998). 
There is another aspect of performance requirements that many DCs tend to 
ignore. When FDI is undertaken in spite of restrictive performance 
requirements, it is frequently because foreign investors are granted 
compensatory advantages in the form of tax incentives and financial subsidies. 
For example, subsidies to attract FDI in automobile factories amounted to 
hundreds of thousands of dollars per job to be created in various countries, 
including several DCs (Oman 2001). 
The “race to the top” in offering FDI incentives is difficult to stop, even though 
the economic case for not taking part in incentives-based competition may be 
strong. Politically, it may not be feasible to withdraw incentives unilaterally. 
Policy coordination seems key to escape this dilemma. Potentially, a MFI could 
make an important contribution towards this end. Realistically, however, little is 
to be expected from the Doha Round. This pessimism is not only because OECD 
countries failed in the 1990s already to tackle the problem of FDI subsidies.3 In 
addition, many DCs insist on preferential treatment with regard to FDI 
                                           
3  The critical issue of incentives-based competition for FDI had been removed from the agenda of 
OECD countries even before the negotiations on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment among 
themselves broke down completely in 1998; for details, see Nunnenkamp and Pant (2003).     10
incentives. They request only ICs to refrain from incentives-based competition, 
while they would like to maintain this option for themselves. 
The insistence of DCs on preferential treatment is highly unlikely to deliver the 
desired results. The preferential treatment DCs have “enjoyed” for decades in 
the GATT framework for trade is a clear reminder in this regard. Various studies 
show that trade preferences, well-intended as they were, did the poorest GATT 
members no good in promoting their world-market integration. Bhagwati (2002: 
26) notes: “The rich countries, denied reciprocal concessions from the poor 
countries, wound up concentrating on liberalising trade in products of interest 
largely to themselves”. The implication for multilateral negotiations on 
incentives-based competition for FDI is obvious: DCs cannot achieve much 
unless they are prepared to forgo flexibility on their own part. 
Furthermore, it would help DCs little if only ICs withdrew FDI incentives. For 
most FDI projects, DCs compete with each other, rather than with highly 
developed countries. Much of the competition for FDI is among neighboring 
countries, or even within particular DCs (Oman 2001). Hence, preferential 
treatment with regard to incentives would hardly be instrumental to 
strengthening the bargaining position of DCs in resisting the demand for 
incentives by foreign investors.     11
IV. WHICH OPTIONS DO DCs HAVE? 
In light of the reasoning in the previous sections, DCs may be tempted to resist 
any mandate of the WTO to negotiate on investment. Yet, policymakers in DCs 
should think twice before drawing such a conclusion. Even though the case for a 
MFI is fairly weak in strictly economic terms, it may make sense for DCs to 
agree to multilateral negotiations on investment. In deciding on strategic 
options, various political-economy factors should be taken into account. The 
following questions deserve particular attention: 
¾  Could DCs strengthen their bargaining position by negotiating investment  
under the roof of the WTO, rather than bilaterally with major ICs? 
¾  Do DCs have a reasonable chance to block multilateral negotiations on 
investment? 
¾  What are the economic costs of making investment-related concessions, 
and what could DCs achieve in terms of reciprocal concessions from ICs? 
As concerns the bargaining strength of DCs, the experience with BITs provides 
a relevant counterfactual. As noted before, negotiating asymmetries are common 
to BITs, which typically do not include provisions against restrictive business 
practices. Hence, DCs may be more successful in pushing for rules on corporate 
behavior by coordinating their request for corporate obligations to be included in 
a MFI. On the other hand, many BITs do not prohibit performance requirements,     12
even though small developing host countries have less bargaining power than 
the industrialized home countries of foreign investors. This is in contrast to the 
multilateral agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), which 
bans certain types of performance requirements (notably, export requirements 
and local content obligations).4 Indications are that the pressure on DCs to 
abolish performance requirements will mount when it comes to multilateral 
negotiations on investment. This suggests that multilateral negotiations may 
improve the bargaining position of DCs in some respects, but not necessarily in 
all respects. 
The answer to the second question is less ambiguous: DCs do not have a 
reasonable chance to block multilateral negotiations on investment altogether. 
Critics of a MFI, e.g., Kumar (2001) and Singh (2001), who argue for a united 
front of DCs against a MFI ignore that conflicts of interest are not only between 
ICs and DCs, but also within the heterogeneous group of DCs. As mentioned 
earlier, the prospects of deriving economic benefits from FDI differ 
considerably across DCs. The demand of ICs for clearly defined multilateral 
rules may be rejected at no cost by DCs anticipating that they will not attract 
growth-enhancing FDI, no matter what investment agreement they sign. By 
                                           
4   However, the effectiveness of the TRIMS agreement appears to be limited for conceptual reasons 
(illustrative list approach, escape clauses) and due to implementation problems (Langhammer 
1994: 9; Nunnenkamp and Pant 2003: 25).     13
contrast, countries for which FDI has more to offer will be more inclined to 
accept what ICs propose.  Moreover, once it comes to multilateral negotiations 
on investment, many DCs have little choice but to join eventually. DCs with 
particularly large markets and strong economic fundamentals (e.g., China) could 
possibly afford to remain outsiders. But smaller and less attractive DCs probably 
cannot, even though a MFI is unlikely to result in more or higher-quality FDI. 
The reason is that not taking part could effectively close the door to FDI for 
these DCs. 
Accepting that a purely defensive strategy of DCs is bound to fail, the third 
question comes to the fore. It is for several reasons that DCs should consider the 
option to commit themselves to rule-based FDI policies as a bargaining chip, 
rather than engaging in futile attempts to block multilateral negotiations on 
investment altogether. The economic costs of giving up flexible and 
discretionary FDI policies are substantially less than many policymakers in DCs 
tend to assume. For example, the findings of Moran (1998) indicate that DCs 
have nothing to lose if they offered to refrain from imposing joint-venture and 
technology-sharing requirements on foreign investors. Financially, DCs may 
even gain from such a move as compensatory FDI incentives would no longer 
be needed.  
Furthermore, an offensive strategy is superior to the currently prevailing 
defensive attitude of DCs since it would provide incentives for quid pro quo-    14
concessions by ICs. The basic logic of WTO negotiations implies that DCs will 
become relevant negotiation partners only by offering something on their own. 
Cross-issue linkage is an important consideration in this regard. The 
economically valid argument advanced by many  DCs that labor mobility is the 
logical counterpart of capital mobility may be the most relevant case in point.5 
The reluctance of ICs to enter into negotiations on labor mobility so far provided 
the justification for DCs to reject the demands of ICs for rule-based FDI 
policies. DCs may fare better by changing strategy, i.e., presenting rule-based 
FDI policies as a carrot and, thereby, increasing the pressure on ICs to agree to 
negotiations on labor mobility. 
                                           
5  Hoekman and Saggi (2000) show that the economic arguments for labor mobility are not weaker 
than those for capital mobility.     15
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